SOME PUZZLES ABOUT ACTION
Below
you will find a list of puzzles or intuition-pumps relating to various problems
in action theory:
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Knobe's (Princeton University) experiments on the Concept of Intentional Action
2. The Relation between Intentions and Intentional Actions
3. Reasons, Goals, Plans, Skills and Luck
1. CAUSAL
DEVIANCE OR WAYWARDNESS
This
problem arises for any theory that identifies an action with part or whole of causal sequence. In a nutshell,
despite being caused by seemingly appropriate mental antecedents, a piece of
bodily behavior can fail to qualify as an
intentional action or even as an action due to the deviant mode of
causation.
Three
kinds of causal deviance have been distinguished in the literature.
Antecedential deviance: when the causal connection
between the antecedent mental events and the initiation of behavior is deviant.
Consequential deviance: when the consequences of the
activity once begun are not as expected.
Tertiary deviance: when the etiology of (some element of)
the plan component of an intention is deviant.
A BUNCH OF NERVOUS
WRECKS: ANTECEDENTIAL WAYWARDNESS
The Nervous Climber
A
climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another
man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he
could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so
unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold. (Davidson, 1980: 79)
The Inexperienced Criminal
Abel,
who is attending a party, wants to spill his drink because he wants to signal
to his confederates to begin the robbery and he believes, in virtue of their
prearrangements, that spilling his drink will accomplish that. But Abel is
inexperienced in crime and this leads him to be very anxious. His anxiety makes
his hand tremble, and so his glass spills (Frankfurt, 1978: 157).
The Marriage Proposal
Suppose
I want and intend to get down on my knees to propose marriage. Contemplating my
plan, I am so overcome with emotion that I suddenly feel weak and sink to my
knees. (Davis, 1994: 113)
A Philosopher's Worries
A
philosopher intends to knock over his glass in order to distract his
commentator. However, his intention so upsets him that his hand shakes
uncontrollably, striking the glass and knocking it to the floor. (Mele, 1992:
182)
LUCKY STRIKES AND NERVES AGAIN: CONSEQUENTIAL WAYWARDNESS
The Killer and the Wild Pigs
A
man may try to kill someone by shooting at him. Suppose the killer misses his
victim by a mile, but the shot stampedes a herd of wild pigs that trampled the
intended victim to death. (Bennett, 1965; Davidson, 1980, Essay 4: 78)
The Sheriff and the Bank Robber
Dan,
the sheriff, sees the bank robber riding down Mainstreet. He wants to shoot him
and believes that by taking careful aim, the bullet from his gun will directly
hit the robber. Dan, however, is a terrible shot. The bullet goes in the wrong
direction; but as luck would have it, the bullet hits a spittoon and ricochets,
hitting the bank robber. (Brand, 1984: 18)
The Murderous Nephew
Carl
wants to kill his rich uncle because he wants to inherit his fortune. He
believes that his uncle is home and drives towards his house. His desire to
kill his uncle agitates him and he drives recklessly. On the way he hits and
kills a pedestrian, who happens to be his uncle. (See Chisholm, 1966: 29-30 and
Brand, 1984: 17-18).
Of B's and Bees
Fred
is taking a machine-readable multiple-choice test. His strategy is to circle on
the question sheet the identifying letters next to the answers that he feels
certain are correct and then, after all such circling is completed, to fill in
the corresponding spaces on his answer sheet. At this point, he will take up
the more difficult questions.
An
hour has elapsed, and Fred is reading the forty-fifth question. He is confident
that the answer is 'bee', which word appears next to the letter 'a' on his
question sheet. However, as a result of an understandable momentary confusion,
he circles the letter 'b'. As luck would have it, 'b' is the correct answer.
Later, when filling in the answer sheet, Fred looks at the circled 'b' under
question 45 and fills in the space under 'b' on his answer sheet – intending
thereby to provide the right answer. (Mele, 1987: 56).
2. INTENTION AND INTENTIONAL ACTION
Is it necessary the case that
for me to intentionally A, I must intend to A?
This conception of the relation between intentional action and intention
is sometimes called the Simple View (Bratman, 1987). The following puzzles seem
to present challenges for that view. These challenges are based on the idea
that there are certain constraints on intentions that do not apply to
intentional actions. Among these are:
The
consistency requirement: one cannot rationally intend to A and intend to B,
if these two intentions are not strongly consistent.
The
strong belief requirement: If one intends to A, one must believe one will
A.
The means-end requirement: For one to intend to A, A must either be an end one pursues or a means towards (or precondition for) such an end.
Video
Games and strong consistency of intentions
Game 1: I am playing a video game in which I am to guide a
'missile' into a certain target. I am quite skilled at such things, but it is a
difficult game and I am doubtful of success. Still, I aim at the target and try
to hit it. As it happens, I succeed in just the way I was trying. My success
was not merely a matter of luck; it depended heavily on my considerable skill
at such games. Further, hitting the target was what I wanted to do; I was not
just aiming at the target as a way of insuring that the 'missile' would go
several inches to the right. (Bratman, 1987: 113)
Game 2: Suppose now a second game is added, a game which
also involves guiding a 'missile' to a certain target. Since I am ambidextrous
and can play one game with each hand, I decide to play both games
simultaneously. As before, the games are difficult and I am doubtful of success
at either of them. As it happens I miss target 2 but I do succeed in hitting
target 1 in the way I was trying and in a way that depended on my relevant
skills. (Ibid.: 114)
Game 3: Suppose that the two games are know to me to be so
linked that it is impossible to hit both targets. If I hit one of the targets,
both games are over. If both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the
machine just shuts down and I hit neither target. Both targets remain visible
to me; so I can see which target I hit if I hit either one. And there is a
reward for hitting either target. But I know that although I can hit each
target, I cannot hit both targets. Still, I know it is difficult to hit either
target, so I decide to play both games simultaneously; I see the risk of
shutting down the machines as outweighed by the increase in my chances of
hitting the target. I proceed to try to hit target 1 and also to try to hit
target 2. I give a try at each game. Suppose I hit target 1 in just the way I
was trying to hit it, and in a way which depends heavily on my considerable
skill at such games.
Uncertainty of
success and strong belief
Heavy typing
In
writing heavily on a page a person may try hard to produce ten legible carbon
copies while being sceptical of success. Nevertheless if this is what he wants
to do and he does succeed in producing ten legible copies, he is certainly
doing it intentionally. (Adapted from Davidson, 1980, Essay 5: 92)
The Sniper
A
sniper shoots at a soldier from a distance, trying to kill him, knowing that
the chances of success are slim. […] If he succeeds, despite the odds, the
sniper kills the soldier intentionally and if he kills him intentionally, must
he not intend to kill him? (Harman, 1976: 433)
Expected
side-effects and the means-end requirement
Marathon Man
Suppose
I intend to run the marathon and believe that I will thereby wear down my
sneakers. Now it seems to me that it does not follow tht I intend to wear down my sneakers, and in
the normal case I will not so intend. […] Even so, if I proceed to run the
marathon and actually do weqr down my sneakers, then I might well do so
intentionally. (Bratman, 1987: 123)
The Sniper Again
In
firing his gun, the sniper knowingly alerts the enemy to his presence. He does
this intentionally, thinking that the gain is worth the possible cost. But he
certainly does not intend to alert the enemy to his presence. (Harman, 1976:
433)
3. Reasons, Goals, plans, skills and luck
Is it always the
case that an agent who has reasons for A-ing, has A-ing as a
goal, and has a plan for A-ing, A's intentionally when he or she
succeeds in A-ing? Some philosophers think that some or all of these conditions
are sufficient for the agent to A intentionally. Others maintain that it
is required as well that the agent have sufficient control over the action, i.
e. that he have a reliable plan for or sufficient skill at A-ing. In other words, his or her success should not depend too
much on luck. Are there actions that cannot in principle be performed
intentionally because they structurally involve an important element of
luck? And how much luck is too much?
Nuclear Explosions
A
nuclear reactor is in danger of exploding. Fred knows that its exploding can be
prevented only by it shutting down, and that it can be shut down only by
punching a certain ten-digit code into a certain computer. Fred is alone in the
control room. Although he knows which computer to use, he has no idea what the
code is. Fred needs to think fast. He decides that it would be better to type
in ten digits than to do nothing. Vividly aware of the odds against typing in
the correct code are astronomical. Fred decides to give it a try. He punches in
the first ten digits that come into his head, in that order, believing of his
so ding that he 'might thereby' shut down the reactor and prevent the
explosion. What luck! He punched in the correct code, thereby preventing a
nuclear explosion. (Mele and Moser, 1994)
Lisa and the Florida
Instant Lottery
Lisa
selects a sequence of six numbers to win a fair instant lottery. Upon punching
her six numbers into the lottery computer, Lisa wins instantly. Did she
intentionally win the lottery? (Mele and Moser, 1994)
Lydia and the Golfing
Contest
Poor
Lydia, who has only one dollar, would love to have a million. There are no
lotteries in her state, but there is a weekly million-dollar contest for
amateur golfers. Contestants pay a dollar for having the privilege of taking
one shot at making a hole in one from a distance of 180 yards. Lydia has never
hit a golf ball, but desperately wanting to become a millionaire and thinking
that there is a remote chance that she will make a hole in one, she enters the
contest. She has seen golf on television, and she estimates her chances of
holing her shot at about one in a million. As Lydia eyes the ball, she
deliberates about how she might achieve the goal or objective of making a hole
in one, giving special attention to what club to use. She selects a three wood,
lines up the shot, and then swings hard, with the goal or objective of making a
hole in one. Lydia does not hit the ball just for the sake of hitting it. Nor
is her objective in hitting it limited to something less than hitting a hole
in one. Her goal is to hit in one,
thereby winning a million dollar. Does
she intend to hit a hole in one. Assuming she tries and succeeds, does she intentionally
hit the hole in one? (Mele, 1997)
Connie Hits the
Bull's-Eye
Connie,
who has never fired a gun, is offered a large cash prize for hitting the
bull's-eye on a distant target that even experts normally miss. She carefully
aims and fires, hitting the target dead centre in just the (direct) way she
hoped she would. […] Was Connie's hitting the target an intentional action? To
simplify matters, suppose that Connie has no natural talent for marksmanship: she tries equally hard to
win even larger prizes for duplicating
the feat, fires five hundred rounds at the target, and does not even come
close. (Mele, 1997)
Connie Hits the
Bull's-Eye Again
Suppose,
conversely, that unbeknownst to her, Connie has an extraordinary natural talent
for marksmanship: she fires five hundred more rounds at the target and hits the
bull's-eye 80% of the time. Was her hitting the bull's-eye the first time she
did intentional action? Is it when she does it for the four-hundredth time?
(Pacherie)